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Case No. 960847-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF APPEAL 
On September 12, 1996, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions for two 
second-degree felonies, i.e., possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, and arranging to distribute a controlled substance. State v. Ramirez, 924 
P.2d 366, 371 (Utah App. 1996). Though affirming the convictions, this Court also 
vacated the sentences due to lack of written findings on the trial court's enhancement to 
a six-year minimum mandatory term under the "acting in concert with two or more 
persons" provision in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.l(5)(c) (1995). Id. 
On remand, the trial court issued written findings and reaffirmed the minimum 
mandatory sentence. Defendant appeals from that decision. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARD 
1. Does subsection 76-3-203. l(5)(c), which directs the trial court to find if a 
defendant acts in concert with two or more persons, violate the right to a jury trial? 
The constitutionality of a statute is a matter of law; consequently, this Court accords no 
deference to a trial court's analysis. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that 
defendant acted in concert with two or more persons? When challenging findings of 
fact, a defendant must marshal the evidence that favors the finding and then 
demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient to support it. State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219, 1223-24 (Utah 1997). 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons - Enhanced 
penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in 
conceit with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the 
offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable 
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
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(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of 
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser 
offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
After remand from a previous appellate court ruling in this matter, i.e, State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996), the trial court held a hearing at which he 
heard argument from trial counsel about the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203. l(5)(c) (1995) and the facts linking defendant to two other persons in the 
commission of this crime (R. 488). The trial court found that the evidence did establish 
that fact and consequently sentenced him to a six-year minimum mandatory term (R. 
489). 
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Factual Statement 
On December 29, 1994, Mary Nevarez, her infant son, and defendant drove to 
the home of Mary's mother and stepfather Robert Larsen (R. 206, 255, 365). 
Following defendant's directions, Mary went inside to ask Larsen if she could borrow 
his car and some money for a trip to California (R. 255). ! Because Mary apparently 
did not relay defendant's message properly, the three returned the next morning. After 
defendant talked to Larsen, Larsen loaned defendant and Mary his car and $550, with 
the understanding that he would get his money back after the trip, along with 3 to 4 
grams of methamphetamine (R. 153, 210, 257). Defendant then gave Larsen a plastic 
baggie containing methamphetamine as insurance against the loss of the car and money 
(R. 154, 258-59). 
Later on the 30th, defendant and Mary left for California in Larsen's vehicle. 
Stopping at various locations along the way, they gambled and lost all but $400 of the 
$550 Larsen had given them as well as Mary's pension money (R. 202, 281-82, 286). 
They finally arrived at defendant's sister's house in California sometime in the morning 
of December 31 (R. 287). 
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 Saying that he felt remorse for agreeing to help defendant and his colleagues bring in 
methamphetamine, Mr. Larsen reported the criminal plans to the police (R. 328). He gave them a 
description of the car, the license plate number, and told them approximately when the delivery was to 
occur (R. 329-32). Consequently, the police followed the car and arrested the participants shortly after 
they consumed the drugs at Melanie Timmons' home in St. George (R. 339). 
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With the remaining $400, defendant bought drugs from people he met in his 
sister's garage (R. 294-95). Defendant hid the drugs, packaged in condoms, in 
Larsen's car "underneath the back ashtray . . . where the stick shift goes into" (R. 
264). Defendant and Mary left California on the evening of the 31st (R. 287, 375). 
On the way home, defendant and Mary met Melanie Timmons in Mesquite (R. 
291, 347, 355, 377). According to Mary, defendant had arranged the meeting: 
"[Melanie] was supposed to meet us there, because she had her car. That way, if we 
were being followed, they wouldn't know what car the drugs were in" (R. 265). 
However, Melanie's car had broken down, and she and her "guy friend" ended up 
driving back to Utah with defendant and Mary in Larsen's car (R. 291, 348, 377). 
After dropping the friend off, Melanie, defendant, and Mary drove to Melanie's 
apartment, arriving there in the pre-dawn hours of January 1 (R. 298, 350, 378). 
Defendant took some methamphetamine from the car, and the three of them "did some 
speed" (R. 296-98). Defendant also gave Mary a green bindle to deliver to Larsen (R. 
297). Mary and Melanie then drove over to Larsen's home, where Mary gave Larsen 
the green bindle, as instructed (R. 300). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Subsection 76-3-203. l(5)(c) does not abridge defendant's right to trial by jury. 
Under governing federal supreme court precedent, the statute neither creates another 
element nor a different criminal offense. Instead, the statute tells the trial court what 
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weight it should give in sentencing to criminal conduct that occurs in conceit with three 
or more people. 
Additionally, the trial court based its finding that three or more people were 
involved in this crime on sufficient evidence. Even if this Court reviews the merits of 
this claim, ignoring defendant's slanted recitation of the evidence, the trial court based 
its decision on the testimony of Mary Nevarez, which it found credible, clear, and 
convincing. That testimony sufficed to establish the enhancement and, consequently, 
the trial court's determination should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSECTION 76-3-203.1(5)(c) DOES NOT DENY 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL BECAUSE 
IT ONLY DIRECTS THE COURT WHAT WEIGHT IT 
SHOULD GIVE A PARTICULAR FACTOR IN 
SENTENCING. 
Defendant asserts that he was entitled to have a jury determine whether he was 
involved with two or more persons in the commission of his crimes (Brief of Defendant 
at 6-10). Because the trial court made that factual decision instead, defendant argues 
that he was denied his constitutional right to trial by jury. 
At the outset, however, defendant is not entitled to appellate review of this claim 
because his brief does not support it with specific, relevant legal authority. The only 
authority defendant quotes is a civil case, Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 
604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979). There, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when a trial 
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court rules on motions that take matters away from a jury, it should examine the 
evidence in a light favorable to the party moved against. Mel Hardman Productions, 
604 P.2d at 917. Though the case restates the essential principle that the right to a jury 
trial should be "carefully safequarded," it is not relevant in its facts to subsection 76-3-
203.1(5)(c) or enhancement statutes generally. 
Defendant asks for a drastic remedy, i.e., invalidation of a statute on 
constitutional grounds. That type of remedy can only be justified by the most extreme 
circumstances and well-argued and reasoned law. Defendant does not make this 
argument and his claim for statutory invalidation, therefore, should not be considered. 
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). 
Even on the merits, however, defendant's claim fails. His fundamental premise 
is that the "acting in concert" provision changed the substantive nature of the offense 
for which he was convicted. In other words, the crime for which defendant was 
sentenced differed from the crime of which the jury convicted him. 
The fundamental flaw in defendant's argument already has been articulated in 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, All U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillan, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected due process and sixth amendment challenges to a statute 
providing that persons convicted of certain felonies would be subject to a minimum 
mandatory sentence of five years if the trial court found that the person "visibly 
possessed a firearm" while committing the crime. Id, at 81. The Court upheld the 
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statute, ruling that it left unaffected the presumption of innocence and the State's 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The enhancement statute did not 
change the definition of the crime or the maximum penalty, nor did it create a separate 
offense. Id. at 87-88. 
Instead, the Pennsylvania statute took one factor and mandated the exact weight 
the trial court could accord it in sentencing. 
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the 
crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a 
separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing 
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range 
already available to it without the special finding of visible 
possession of a firearm. Section 9712 "ups the ante" for the 
defendant only by raising the five years the minimum 
sentence which may be imposed within the statutory plan. 
Id. at 87-88 (footnote omitted). Thus deciding that section 9712 did not create a new 
offense, the high court concluded that the right to jury trial did not include the right to 
jury sentencing, "even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." Id. at 93. 
Because section 9712 was a sentencing provision only, it did not conflict with the jury 
trial right. Subsection 76-3-203.l(5)(c) closely tracks the statute that the McMillan 
court upheld. It leaves undisturbed the elements of the underlying crime and becomes 
effective only upon conviction of the base crime. Though it "ups the ante" for 
defendant, it does so without increasing the maximum penalty or creating a separate 
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offense. All the statute does, as in McMillan, is dictate the weight that trial court 
should give one factor in sentencing. 
O. THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO FIND THAT TWO PEOPLE IN ADDITION TO 
DEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN THE 
POSSESSION AND ARRANGING FOR THE SALE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE; THEREFORE, 
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICffiNCY CHALLENGE 
SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Defendant challenges the evidentiary basis for the trial court's finding that 
Melanie Timmons was part of defendant's criminal conduct. Brief of Defendant at 10-
12. He claims insufficiency to support that finding, which, if overturned, would 
require reversal of the enhancement. However, defendant's purported marshaling of 
the evidence does not meet that strict requirement because it relies on selected, and 
slanted portions of the testimony. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). This Court need not consider 
defendant's claim of insufficiency due to this marshaling failure; however, even if it 
did, the trial court's findings were based on a firm factual foundation and, should be 
affirmed. 
"Successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate courts 
first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why such 
findings contradict the weight of the evidence." State in the Interest ofS.T., 928 P.2d 
393, 400 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053)). Though 
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defendant purports to marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings, 
actually, he only presents selected, and favorable, portions. This is not satisfy 
Oneida's marshaling test, which specifically says that an appellant cannot simply 
attempt to reargue his case by using "selected facts and excerpts in support of its 
position.n Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053. 
In his purported "marshaling," defendant raises only snippets of relevant 
testimony, pointing out the few ambiguities in Mary Nevarez's statements and ignoring 
the many consistencies. He leaves out important evidence about Ms. Nevarez' 
admitted involvement and her testimony about Melanie Timmons' involvement:2 (1) 
defendant had arranged with Ms. Timmons to meet at the Peppermill casino and follow 
him and Ms. Nevarez back to Salt Lake City so that police would not know which car 
contained the drugs (R. 264-65)3; (2) defendant told Ms. Nevarez that he went over to 
Ms. Timmons' house to divide the drugs (R. 267); (3) defendant, Ms. Nevarez, Ms. 
Timmons, and another person used the methamphetamine (R. 268, 297). Defendant 
also relies on the testimony of Ms. Timmons whereas the trial court did not. 
Instead, the trial court grounded its findings on Ms. Nevarez' testimony, "the 
testimony of Mary Nevarez was convincing, clear, and proof to the Court beyond a 
2
 Ms. Nevarez testified for the State (R. 253); Ms. Timmons testified for the defense (R. 
346). 
3
 This plan ultimately failed because Ms. Timmons' car broke down in Las Vegas (R. 
264). She went the rest of the way with defendant and Ms. Nevarez (id.). Consequently, they were all 
in the same car, at the same time, with the methamphetamine. 
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reasonable doubt as to this transaction and the activities taking place in the furtherance 
of the criminal enterprise" (R. 486). Her testimony was credible, especially given her 
own then-pending trial on drug possession charges (R. 273).4 A careful review of the 
trial court's findings shows that it was based on the evidence and it contains no "fatal 
flaw" (R. 487). 
7. That the anticipated plan of the parties, which never 
came to fruition, was to transfer the drugs that were 
purchased to Ms. Timmons' vehicle and have Ms. 
Timmons' vehicle carry the drugs into the State of Utah in 
order to defeat any potential police surveillance. That plan 
went awry. 
8. That Ms. Timmons' vehicle broke down, and she was 
in Mesquite without a vehicle. Therefore, all three, Ms. 
Timmons, Mr. Ramirez, and Ms. Nevarez, travelled [sic] 
back to Utah, again with the single criminal objective and 
the single criminal enterprise of transporting this 
methamphetamine back to the State of Utah. 
10. That the Court further finds ... the Defendant, Ms. Nevarez, 
and Ms. Timmons, went to Ms. Timmons' apartment and there 
together injecting [sic] methamphetamine, and based upon that final 
completing act of the transportation, the acquiring, and eventually 
the use of methamphetamine, the Court entered the order 
enhancing the sentence. 
(R. 487-88; Findings of Fact, attached as addendum). 
4
 Ms. Nevarez stated that she was subpoenaed to testify at defendant's trial and that the 
State had promised her she would not be certified as an adult in exchange for the testimony (R. 273). 
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The trial court's findings were consistent with the evidence and supported by it. 
Therefore, defendant's challenge to its sufficiency must fail, both on substantive 
grounds and due to his failure to marshal correctly. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's imposition of a six-year minimum mandatory enhancement 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS j>_ July 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On ^ _ July 1997,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) copies of 
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
LaMAR J. WINWARD 
150 North 200 East, Suite 204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
U/rtu»- AlAjkf 
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARTURO RAMIREZ, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, 
SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal No. 951*00020 FS 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-entitled matter having come on before the Court 
after remand from the Court of Appeals for entry of additional 
findings supporting the Court's conclusion that defendant acted 
in concert with two or more persons during the commission of 
Count II, Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a 2nd 
Degree Felony, and for re-sentencing based upon these findings on 
the on the 20th day of November, 1996, with the Plaintiff being 
represented by Wade Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney, 
and the Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, being present and represented 
by Lamar J. Winward, and counsel for Defendant having made his 
arguments and recommendations to the Court, and counsel for 
Plaintiff having been heard in rebuttal, and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises, and there being no reason why 
judgment should not be entered, now makes and enters its 
Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment, as follows: 
d<7^ 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, is guilty of the offense of COUNT I: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a 
2nd Degree Felony, and COUNT II: ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 2nd Degree Felony. 
PINDINGS 
THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Defendant, together with Mary Nevarez, had a 
close relationship in the latter part of 1994 and early 1995. 
2. That on December 29, 1994, Ms. Nevarez and the Defendant 
went to the home of Robert Larson. There a discussion was held 
with Ms. Nevarez and Mr. Larson and the Defendant in which it was 
discussed that the Defendant and Ms. Nevarez would borrow Mr. 
Larsonfs car to make a trip to California, and there acquire 
methamphetamine. 
3. The Court's findings are based upon the Courtfs finding 
that the testimony of Mary Nevarez was convincing, clear, and 
proof to the Court beyond a reasonable doubt as to this 
transaction and the activities taking place in the furtherance of 
this criminal enterprise. 
4. That Mr. Larson, as I indicated at the time of 
sentencing and as I again indicate, has no credibility before 
this court, and based upon Mr. Larson's testimony and his version 
of the events and the events, this Court could not make a 
finding, even by a preponderance of the evidence, so the Court is 
relying substantially on the careful evaluation of the testimony 
of Ms. Nevarez, my understanding of her testimony, and the other 
physical circumstances supporting her testimony, the traveling of 
the car and those kinds of things that were observed by the 
witnesses. 
5. The Court further finds that the factual background that 
Ms. Nevarez and the Defendant also received $550 from Mr. Larson, 
which they took oOn the trip with them to California. A portion 
of that money was to be expended for the purchase of 
methamphetamine in the State of California, and $400 was expended 
for that purpose. 
6. That the Defendant and Ms. Nevarez, after purchasing the 
drugs in California, spending the $400 on that purchase, came 
back to the State of Utah along Interstate 15, had planned to 
meet and in fact did meet with Melanie Timmons in Mesquite, 
Nevada. 
7. That the anticipated plan of the parties, which never 
came to fruition, was to transfer the drugs that were purchased 
to Ms. Timmons1 vehicle and have Ms. Timmons1 vehicle carry the 
drugs into the State of Utah in order to defeat any potential 
police surveillance. That plan went awry. 
8. That Ms. Timmons' vehicle broke down, and she was in 
Mesquite without a vehicle. Therefore, all three, Ms. Timmons, 
Mr. Ramirez, and Ms. Nevarez, travelled back to Utah, again with 
the single criminal objective and the single criminal enterprise 
of transporting this methamphetamine back to the State of Utah. 
9. That there was a friend in the company of Ms. Timmons, 
but the Court does not find, and has no evidence before it, and 
u
 i i 
did not at the time of trial have any evidence that this friend 
was in any way involved with the criminal enterprise. The 
evidence and testimony was convincing to the Court only as to the 
involvement of Melanie Timmons. 
10. That the Court further finds that once the friend was 
dropped off from the car, the three individuals, the Defendant, 
Ms. Nevarez, and Ms. Timmons, went to Ms. Timmons1 apartment and 
there together injesting methamphetamine, and based upon that 
final completing act of the transportation, the acquiring, and 
eventually the use of methamphetamine, the Court entered the 
order enhancing the sentence. 
11. That with respect to the ruling that the defense has 
urged upon the Court regarding the constitutionality of Section 
76-3-203.2, this Court finds that the statute is, in fact, 
constitutional, and that I will not step outside the ordinary 
rules for trial courts of construing statutes. 
12. That based upon the foregoing findings, the Defendant 
shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisons of Section 
76-3-203.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, shall serve one less than one (1) year 
nor more than fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison and pay 
a fine in the amount of $10,000.00, plus a surcharge of $8,500.00 
for his conviction for COUNT I: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a 2nd Degree Felony. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
(\9<Z 
Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, shall serve in enhanced minimum term 
of not less than six (6) years nor more than fifteen (15) years 
in the Utah State Prison and pay a fine in the amount of 
$10,000,00, plus a surcharge of $8,500,00 for his conviction for 
COUNT II: ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a 2nd 
Degree Felony. 
COMMITMENT 
THE SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Utah, is hereby 
commanded to transport the Defendant, ARTURO RAMIREZ, to the Utah 
State Prison, there to be kept and confined in accordance with 
the above Order. . " .
 v \, 
DATED this / Q day of Decembe^, 1$36; 
*1 
JAMES. L, SHUMATE "\. „' 
^DISTRICT' COURT J U D G W 
.- 2 
CERTIFICATE c.,C-,
 u ^^ STATE OF UTAH ) ^sssssS>^ 
* ss 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, Linda Williamson, Clerk of said District Court of 
Washington County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
Honorable James L. Shumate, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate, is the Judge of said Court, duly 
commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of said Judge 
to said certificate is genuine* 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have^lSrtiCr^o^t my hand and 
affixed the seal of the Court thig' vy* daj^^ltecember, 1996. 
LINDA WILLIAMSON,: Clerk by Sm* fl\.Kk£/ 
DEPUTY CLERK .." ^  / 
^>^ 
SHERIFF'S RETURN 
I do hereby certify that on the a&> day of *£ecenitoer,—1996, 
the Defendant, AR*-URO RAMIREZ, was transported to the Utah State 
Prison, there to be kept and confined in accordance with the 
above Commitment. 
L,M OA^^ 
JON J. 
WASHIjfGTM COUNTY/UNDERSHERIFF 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this U^*- day of December, 1996, I 
delivered a true ^nd correct unsigned copy of the foregoing 
AMENDED JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT to the 
office of Defendant's counsel, Lamar J Winward, at 150 North 200 
East, Suite 204, St. George, UT 84770. 
(Jjlu^£U^^6rV~^ 
SECRETARY 
M<?n 
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Arturo Ramirez, Defendant and Appellant 
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924 P.2d 366, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
September 12,1996, FILED 
Fifth District, St. George Department. The Honorable James L. Shumate. 
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Lamar J. Winward, St. George, for Appellant. 
Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES 
Before Judges James Z. Davis, Judith M. Billings, and Regnal W. Garff.1 WE CONCUR: James Z. 
Davis, Associate Presiding Judge, Regnal W. Garff, Senior Judge. 
AUTHOR: BILLINGS 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Arturo Ramirez appeals his jury convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995), and arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995). We affirm 
defendant's conviction but vacate defendant's sentence for lack of sufficient findings of fact and 
remand for appropriate findings and resentencing. 
FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Hancock, 874 
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
On December 29, 1994, Mary Nevarez, her infant son, and defendant drove to the home of 
Ms. Nevarez's mother and stepfather, Robert Larsen. Pursuant to defendant's instructions, Ms. 
Nevarez went inside to ask Mr. Larsen if she could borrow his car and some money for a trip she 
and defendant were taking to California. Because Ms. Nevarez apparently did not relay the 
message properly, the three returned the next morning and defendant spoke with Mr. Larsen. 
After their conversation, Mr. Larsen agreed to loan defendant and Ms. Nevarez his car and $ 
550, with the understanding that he would get his money back after the trip, along with 
three-to-four grams of methamphetamine. Defendant then handed Mr. Larsen a plastic baggie 
containing methamphetamine to insure against the loss of the car and money. 
Defendant and Ms. Nevarez left for California in Mr. Larsen's vehicle later that day. They 
made several stops along the way, gambling and losing approximately $ 150 of the money Mr. 
Larsen had loaned them. The two finally arrived at the home of defendant's sister in California. 
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With the remaining $ 400, defendant purchased drugs from people he met within his sister's 
garage. He then hid the drugs in Mr. Larsen's vehicle. Defendant and Ms. Nevarez left California 
that evening. 
On their way home, defendant and Ms. Nevarez met Melanie Timmons in Mesquite, Nevada. 
According to Ms. Nevarez, defendant had pre-arranged this meeting. Ms. Nevarez stated: "[Ms. 
Timmons] was supposed to meet us there, because she had a car. That way, if we were being 
followed, they wouldn't know what car the drugs were in." However, Ms. Timmons's car had 
broken down and she and a friend wound up chiving back to Utah with defendant and Ms. 
Nevarez. 
Once in Utah, they dropped Ms. Timmons's friend off and then drove to her apartment in the 
early morning hours of January 1, 1995. Defendant took some methamphetamine from the car, 
and the three of them "did some speed." At that time, defendant gave Ms. Nevarez a green bindle 
to deliver to Mr. Larsen. Ms. Timmons and Ms. Nevarez then drove to Mr. Larsen's home, where 
Ms. Nevarez gave him the green bindle as instructed. 
Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged in a criminal information with Count I, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and Count II, arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance. The charging information also alleged the offenses were 
performed in concert with two or more individuals, and thus, defendant was subject to an 
enhanced minimum sentence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995). 
A jury trial was held on May 4, 1995. After defendant put on his case, the State filed a 
Motion in Limine requesting permission to allow Ms. Nevarez to testify on rebuttal as to other 
similar trips she had taken with defendant to purchase drugs. The trial court granted the motion 
over defendant's objection. The jury found defendant guilty of both counts. 
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel objected to the trial court's imposition of an 
enhanced penalty because the question of how many persons were involved was never put to the 
jury. The court overruled defendant's objections, stating the statute expressly authorized the 
court, not the jury, to find that the defendant acted in "concert" with two or more persons. The 
court thereafter entered a ruling that defendant had acted in concert with Ms. Nevarez and Ms. 
Timmons in committing Count II and enhanced the penalty for that offense to a six-year 
minimum mandatory term. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
On appeal, defendant claims: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Ms. 
Nevarez's testimony regarding two previous drug-buying trips she had taken with defendant, (2) 
defendant was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury when the trial court, acting 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995), found he acted in concert with two or 
more persons in arranging to distribute a controlled substance, and (3) the trial court's findings of 
fact supporting its sentence enhancement were inadequate. 
ANALYSIS 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 403 
Defendant first contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Ms. Nevarez's 
testimony regarding two previous trips she had allegedly taken with defendant to purchase drugs 
and therefore his conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial. 
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Specifically, defendant argues the evidence should not have been admitted under Rule 404(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, because the sole purpose of the testimony was to show defendant's bad 
character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Alternatively, defendant claims that even if the evidence is 
admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court nonetheless erred in admitting the evidence under 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because the prejudicial value of the evidence clearly 
outweighed it probativeness. See id. Rule 403. 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence under Rules 403 
and 404, this court will sustain the trial court's ruling unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
State v, Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993). 
Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Utah courts have recognized that Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary" rule. 
State v. OfNeil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). That is, Rule 404(b) "does not exclude evidence 
unless it fits an exception; rattier, it allows admission of relevant evidence 'other than to show 
merely the general disposition of the defendant.'" State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983)). 
In overruling defendant's objections and admitting the instant testimony, the trial court stated: 
It is the clear circumstance in this case that Mr. Ramirez' testimony brought into direct 
question the presence of his knowledge of what may have been criminal activity under a 
possibility of his theory of the lawsuit. That is, that Miss Nevarez, without telling him what was 
going on, perpetrated a fraud upon Mr. Larsen. Talked him out of money with the plan of 
exchanging a small amount of drugs as part of a scheme to talk Mr. Larsen out of his vehicle and 
his money. The testimony of Miss Nevarez on rebuttal negated that issue. 
It also showed the possibility of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and absence of mistake 
or accident on the part of Mr. Ramirez. 
We agree that, by presenting himself as one who was innocently involved in criminal activity 
engineered solely by Ms. Nevarez, defendant put his own knowledge and intent squarely at issue. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting Ms. Nevarez's rebuttal testimony under Rule 
404(b). State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135,136 (Utah 1978). 
In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court found, under predecessor Rule 55, that by testifying he 
was innocently involved in his son's criminal actions, Brown directly put in issue his own 
knowledge and intent. Id. The court therefore held that evidence of an alleged prior, similar 
offense was properly admitted as evidence of Brown's knowledge and intent for the instant 
offense despite Brown's claim that the evidence was highly prejudicial. Id. Similarly, in this 
case, as soon as defendant offered his theory of the case-that Ms. Nevarez had misled him and 
had perpetrated a fraud on Mr. Larsen-defendant's prior drug-buying trips to California with Ms. 
Nevarez became relevant to the issue of his knowledge and intent. Accordingly, the trial court's 
admission of Ms. Nevarez's testimony under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion. 
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Defendant next contends the court nevertheless erred in finding, pursuant to Rule 403, the 
probative value of the evidence "substantially outweighed . . . the danger of unfair prejudice." 
Utah R. Evid. 403. We note that Rule 403, like Rule 404(b), is an "inclusionary" rule. State v. 
Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996). Specifically, Rule 403 "presumes the 
admission of all relevant evidence except where the evidence has 'an unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1221-22 (Utah 1993)). Moreover, the fact that evidence is prejudicial does not, by itself, render 
that evidence inadmissible. Rather, "if the evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally 
probative[,]... it is properly admissible." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571. 
In balancing the probative value of Rule 404(b) evidence against the danger of unfair 
prejudice, the trial court should consider factors such as "'[1] the similarities between the crimes 
[and] the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, [2] the need for the evidence [and] 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and [3] the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility.'" Id. (citation omitted). The record in the instant case clearly 
supports the balance struck by the trial court. First, in the six weeks preceding this incident, Ms. 
Nevarez testified she accompanied defendant on two similar trips to California for the purpose of 
purchasing drugs. See 818 P.2d at 569 ('"Proximity in time combined with similarity in type of 
crime virtually guarantees admittance of prior bad acts evidence.'") (quoting United States v. 
Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S. Ct. 1830, 108 L. Ed. 2d 
959 (1990)). Further, the testimony elicited at trial was conflicting regarding the purpose of the 
trip and defendant's knowledge and intent in making the trip; thus, the need for the evidence was 
great. Finally, the evidence was not of the sort that would likely "rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that any prejudice inherent in Ms. Nevarez's 
testimony was clearly outweighed by its probative effect. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting her testimony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
Defendant next contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury when the 
judge made certain factual findings under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1995) in order to 
impose a gang enhancement upon his sentence. Utah courts have consistently refused to reach the 
constitutionality of a statute when there are other independent grounds to resolve the case. See 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah App. 1987). In accordance with this view, we 
decline to determine the constitutionality of the statute in this case as we vacate defendant's 
enhanced sentence and remand in order for the trial court to make the written findings of fact 
required under the statute. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 1996 Utah LEXIS 48, 293 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah 1996) (holding failure of trial court to make written findings of fact 
under section 76-3-203.1 was both plain and harmful error). 
In Labrum, the supreme court held the imposition of [section 76-3-20l(5)(c)] is explicitly 
"contingent upon" findings of particular enumerated facts that are to be rendered in writing. 
Specifically, the defendant must have acted "in concert" with at least two other persons, which . . 
. means that those other persons must also be liable [though not necessarily charged or convicted] 
for the underlying offense. These findings are indispensable to [section 76-3-201] because they 
establish the legal basis that justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty. Moreover, the 
requirement for written findings appears in the text of the statute 
Id, at 21. The court concluded that the trial court's failure to enter any written findings of 
fact was error, both plain and harmful. Id, Pursuant to Labrum, we conclude defendant's failure 
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to object to the adequacy of the trial court's findings below does not preclude this court from 
reaching that issue on appeal. Certainly, a trial court's failure to comply with the express terms of 
section 76-3-203.l(5)(c) constitutes plain error. 
The trial court's only finding in the instant case states: 
1. The defendant acted in concert with Melanie Timmons and Mary Nevarez in the 
commission of Count II, Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony. 
This finding is not based on the testimony of Robert Larsen. 
Defendant claims this finding does not comply with section 76-3-203. l(5)(c) and asserts the 
finding "[is] more in nature of [a] conclusionf ] of law on the part of the judge and not [a] 
finding[ ] of fact showing the other parties' involvement in the alleged crimes or why their 
involvement meets the elements of the particular statute in question." On appeal, this court must 
therefore determine whether the trial court's singular statement is adequate to support the court's 
imposition of an enhanced minimum mandatory term pursuant to section 76-3-203.1. 
Relying upon Labrum, this court recently rejected the State's claim that when reviewing the 
trial court's findings pursuant to section 76-3-201, a similar sentencing statute, "this court should 
imply the requisite facts because '[a] finding may be implied if it is clear from the record, and 
therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's 
decision.'" State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 1996 Utah App. LEXIS 75, 294 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 6 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). This court declined to imply the aggravating facts 
where there was no mitigating evidence offered at sentencing, instead holding that the "trial 
court's failure to enter findings regarding the aggravating circumstances . . . was error." Id. at 7. 
Thus, in interpreting the supreme court's holding in Labrum, this court implicitly held that 
findings of fact may not be inferred, but must clearly be made part of the record at sentencing. 
Id. at 6-7; see also State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1990) (holding 
judgment of prior conviction providing basis for sentence enhancement must be written, clear, 
and definite). 
Similarly, in the instant case, we will not merely imply what testimony might have persuaded 
the trial court in imposing an enhanced minimum term pursuant to section 76-3-203.l(5)(c). 
Accordingly, under Labrum and Beltran-Felix, the trial court's failure to enter detailed factual 
findings supporting its imposition of an enhanced penalty was error, and we therefore vacate 
defendant's sentence and remand to the trial court for it to make appropriate factual findings and 
for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Ms. Nevarez's 
rebuttal testimony, pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as defendant 
put his knowledge and intent at issue by his own characterization of the case. Further, we 
conclude the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact supporting its conclusion that 
defendant acted in concert with two or more persons during the commission of Count II. 
Accordingly, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand for the court to make appropriate 
factual findings and for resentencing based upon those findings. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
CONCURRENCE 
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WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge Regnal W. Garff, Senior Judge 
JUDGES FOOTNOTES 
1 Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-4(2) (1995); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-108(4). 
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